India’s nuclear deterrence has survived until now in spite of the Indo-China tense standoff since last six months. Massive PLA mobilisation has created an unprecedented security scenario for the first time after the 1962 war. That means that the existing Nuclear Doctrine has served its aim.
However, an examination of the existing doctrine will indicate that with the fast changing security dynamics in this region and the new emerging technologies, there is a requirement for upgrading the existing doctrine and the need for fast tracking it’s ‘Development and Force Structuring’, which give intrinsic stability. This may negate the risk of deterrence hanging on a slender thread.
This poses a few questions on India’s existing nuclear posturing, which is correlated to its existing doctrine. Is there is a case to factor the Power of ‘Nuclear Deterrence’ in our National Security Strategy to offset the conventional asymmetry with the adversary-like drawing thresholds to support war-fighting etc. ?